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keep to my diet. It would be wrong to say in retrospect
that I didn't really care about having the cheesecake in
the first place. Rather, we should say I no longer care
about having more cheesecake because, having
committed dietary sin, I now care more about returning
to my diet. In short, I do not see how Russow's
distinction between "caring about" and "thinking we
care about" does more work than the distinction between
"taking an interest in" and "successfully promoting
one's self-interest." To say that smokers take an interest
in smoking, but smoking is not really in their selfinterest, strikes me as more in accord with our ordinary
concepts than saying that smokers think they care about
smoking, but do not really care, since smoking does
not contribute to their long-term happiness. Similarly,
to say that my cat Bryseis takes an interest in roaming
free outside, but roaming free outside is not really in
her self-interest, makes more sense to me than to say
that Bryseis thinks she cares about roaming free outside,
but she does not really care, since it probably endangers
her long-term happiness.
Russow has made a decent attempt to advance the
discussion of how best to talk about animals' interests,
desires, and happiness. However, her proposed
defmition of "caring about" fails to mark the qualitative
difference between caring about an object and caring
about a subject and does not, in fact, accord well with
our ordinary concept of caring about generally.
Moreover, since Russow's discussion is deficient at the
theoretical level on these points, its application to
questions about specific animals-for example, whether
housecats care about being allowed to stray outside,
being spayed or neutered, etc.-is not promising.
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I could respond by answering Professor Stephens'
specific questions about his cats: either offering a
judgment about what they do and don't care about, or
explaining what one would do to determine that. But
that would fill up all the remaining time, and miss his
deeper concerns. Instead, I'll say just a few words about
two more general concerns that he raises, either
explicitly or implicitly:
(1) how we can determine the object of intentional

states, including caring, and
(2) why "caring about" is an improvement over talk
about interests.
I take it that the philosophical issue underlying
Stephens' questions about what his cats care about in
specific incidents is the concern that there may be no
legitimate way of answering these questions. The full
answer to his concern would be too complicated to lay
out in detail-not because he's asking about cats, but
because specifying the object of any mental state is a
complicated business. Nonetheless, I'll try to indicate
some of the factors that should be involved.
First, sometimes de re specifications of mental states
are the most appropriate ones. That is to say, we can
say that Chryseis believes of Stephens that he is a source
of food, without claiming or being committed to
anything about how he is "represented." The same is
true of other propositional attitudes, especially caring
about. Thus, it is certainly reasonable, and perhaps even
necessary, at times to read "Chryseis cares about
Stephens" as a de re attitude.
Even if there is good reason to demand a de dicto
account of a mental state, there still may be good
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reason to suspect that we may not be able to specify
the content of the state in English. First, the concepts
of an individual who does not use or know English
may well be different in important ways from those
easily expressible in English. Indeed, given the
anti-Fregean moves in contemporary philosophy of
language, the so-called ''narrow content" of a state may
not be properly expressible in any public language.
Second, when we are concerned specifically with
caring about, rather than just any mental state, we are
apt to conflate questions about how to specify the
object of the state with the more practical issue: what
would count as an adequate substitute for what is cared
about, what would make the subject happy in the same
sort of way. Thus, when we ask whether a cat really
cares about her dead companion, we may really be
trying to figure out whether introducing a new kitten
would "make things right again."
As I said, these remarks only touch the surface of
questions about fixing and describing the objects of
care, but I hope they are in keeping with my original
suggestion: current developments in philosophy of
mind can help us develop a more sophisticated and
more accurate way of thinking about the objects of
mental states.
The second issue I want to address is the proper
understanding of "care." I have proposed to analyze
"caring about" in terms of two factors: desire and
happiness. Thus, we can say about cats who want go
outside: they might desire to roam, but would be happier
staying inside, even though they don't realize that. The
question of how we should interpret a cat's behavior in
order "to judge what would make her happiest" is
misleading: the eat's current behavior is often not the
sole or even most important data about what will make
her happy. Since the second condition in our definition
of "caring about" refers to the future, it is possible for x
to be such that it will make one happy, and thus it is
possible for someone to care about x, but not know that
x will make her happy, and hence not know that she
cares about x. This state of affairs is even more likely
to occur with nonhuman animals than with normal,
adult, language using humans. It is also relevant to
cases such as Stephens' cheesecake example: if eating
the cheesecake did not, in fact, contribute to his
happiness (i.e., he eats the cheesecake and is no
happier afterwards-perhaps even feels disappointed),
I would argue that, even though he wanted or desired
the cheesecake, he was simply mistaken in thinking
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that he cared about it. If we tell the story slightly
differently (eating one small slice of cake made him
happy, given that he was able to return to his diet), then
we should conclude that he cares about eating
cheesecake in moderation.
Proper attention to the details of my proposal is also
relevant to Stephens' suggestion that my proposed
analysis of caring fails to do justice to caring for other
subjects. I explicit denied the claim that we care about
things because they contribute to our happiness. If we
avoid that mistake, I fail to see how caring for other
subjects falls outside my account.
I can only briefly mention two other points
Stephens brings up. First, does the fact that Scares
about x engender a prima facie duty to ensure that S
obtains x? The short answer is that my account was not
intended to give a complete answer, although I will point
out that we do hold people morally culpable for
neglecting animals for whom they are responsible.
Second, he objects to my claim that computers might
have desires on the grounds that they don't have nervous
systems. This seems to me to beg the question against
artificial intelligence in particular, and functionalist
accounts of mind in general.
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